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Although current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusions are based on unusual experiences, they diﬀer
in the role that they accord experience in the formation of delusions. On some accounts, the experience comprises the very
content of the delusion, whereas on other accounts the delusion is adopted in an attempt to explain an unusual experience.
We call these the endorsement and explanationist models, respectively. We examine the debate between endorsement and
explanationist models with respect to the ‘alien control’ delusion. People with delusions of alien control believe that their
actions and/or thoughts are being controlled by an external agent. Some accounts of alien control (e.g., Frith, Blakemore,
& Wolpert, 2000a) are best thought of in explanationist terms; other accounts (e.g., Jeannerod, 1999) seem more suited to
an endorsement approach. We argue that recent cognitive and neurophysiological evidence favours an endorsement model
of the delusion of alien control.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences
of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been
replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal aﬀective experience in response to seeing a known per-
son; loss of the aﬀective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been
replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). Similarly, the Cotard delusion (which involves the belief that
one is dead or unreal in some way) may stem from a general ﬂattening of aﬀective responses to external stimuli
(Ellis & Young, 1990), while the seed of the Fre´goli delusion (the belief that one is being followed by known
people who are in disguise) may lie in heightened aﬀective responses to unfamiliar faces (Davies, Coltheart,1053-8100/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.008
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ARTICLE IN PRESSLangdon, & Breen, 2001). Experience-based proposals have been provided for a number of other delusions
(Breen, Caine, Coltheart, Hendy, & Roberts, 2000; Breen, Caine, & Coltheart, 2001; Davies et al., 2001;
Davies, Aimola Davies, & Coltheart, 2005; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Maher, 1988; Stone & Young, 1997).
But behind this broad agreement lies an important controversy about the precise role that experience plays
in the formation of delusions. On some accounts the experience comprises the very content of the delusion,
such that the delusional patient simply believes what they experience; the delusional belief encodes the content
of the perceptual experience in linguistic form. We will call such accounts endorsement accounts, on the
grounds that the person believes—that is, doxastically endorses—the content of their perceptual state, or at
least something very much like the content of their perceptual state.1 An endorsement account of the Capgras
delusion, for example, would hold that the Capgras patient sees the woman he is looking at (who is his wife) as
an imposter (that is, as someone who merely looks like his wife).
Other experience-based accounts of delusion construe the relationship between delusional experience and
delusional belief in explanationist terms. The patient adopts the delusion in an attempt to explain, or make sense
of, an unusual experience. According to the explanationist, the Capgras patient does not perceive his wife as an
impostor, rather, he simply fails to have the expected experience of familiarity when looking at his wife. He
forms the belief that the woman he is looking at is not his wife in an attempt to explain his lack of aﬀect.2
In this paper, we employ the distinction between endorsement and explanationist models to evaluate
accounts of the ‘alien control’ delusion. People with delusions of alien control believe that their actions
and/or thoughts are being controlled by an external agent. Some accounts of alien control (e.g., Frith
et al., 2000a) are best thought of in explanationist terms; other accounts (e.g., Jeannerod, 1999) seem more
suited to an endorsement approach. We argue that recent cognitive and neurophysiological evidence favours
an endorsement model of the delusion of alien control.
2. Two experiential routes to delusion
Let us consider the distinction between endorsement and explanationist models in more detail. First, it
should be noted that it is possible that a comprehensive account of delusions will contain both endorsement
and explanationist elements. Perhaps some delusions should be accounted for in endorsement terms and oth-
ers in explanationist terms. It is also possible that in some instances patients adopt delusional beliefs in an
attempt to explain their unusual experience, but as a result of having adopted the delusional belief their expe-
riences come to inherit the content of the delusion itself. For example, someone might form the Capgras delu-
sion in an attempt to account for their strange experience of lack of aﬀect, but having formed the delusion may
come to see their wife as an imposter (see Fleminger, 1992).
Experience-based accounts of delusions involve (at least) two components: (i) an explanation of the delu-
sional patient’s experiential state; and (ii) an explanation of the delusional patient’s doxastic state (his belief).
Endorsement and explanationist models face distinct challenges in providing these explanations. Explanation-
ist models appear to have an easier job of (i) than endorsement models: the less one packs into the content of
the perceptual experience, the easier it is to explain how the experiential state acquires its content. Very prim-
itive explanationist models, according to which the delusion in question is generated by nothing more than an
absence of certain kinds of aﬀect, would seem to have rather little work to do here.
But what explanationist models gain with respect to (i) they lose with respect to (ii). The explanationist
holds that delusional beliefs are adopted in an attempt to explain unusual experiences. The problem with this
suggestion is that delusional beliefs are typically very poor explanations of the events that they are supposedly
intended to explain. More plausible explanations of their strange experiences are available to the patients,
some of which might be actively recommended to them by family and medical staﬀ. Furthermore, delusional
patients do not appear to hold their delusions in the tentative and provisional manner with which explanations
are usually held. Explanationists are well-positioned to account for the content of the patient’s experiential1 The ‘‘something very much like’’ clause is intended to handle the worry that while the delusional belief has conceptual content, the
perceptual state might have only non-conceptual content.
2 For discussions of the possible contents of the abnormal experience in Capgras delusion see Bayne and Pacherie (2004a, 2004b);
Pacherie (forthcoming).
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delusional beliefs they adopt in response to those experiences.
By contrast, endorsement models would seem to have a more plausible story to tell about how delusional
patients move from experiences to belief. Perhaps, as Davies et al. (2001) suggest, delusional individuals might
have diﬃculties inhibiting the pre-potent doxastic response to their experiences. Seeing is certainly not believ-
ing, but the transition from perceiving ‘that P’ to believing ‘that P’ is a familiar and attractive one. Of course,
things are not completely plain sailing for the endorsement theorist. For one thing, we would need to know
why delusional patients fail to take account of their background beliefs; why do they fail to inhibit the pre-
potent doxastic response in the way that a ‘healthy’ person presumably would, if faced with the same bizarre
and implausible sensory experience?3 But on the face of things the endorsement account looks to have a more
plausible account of why, given the experiences that the account ascribes to the patients, they go on to form
the beliefs that they do. Where the endorsement account would appear to be weakest is in explaining how
delusional patients could have the experiences that the account says they do. We return to this point below.
How does the distinction between endorsement and explanationist models map on to the better-known dis-
tinction between one-deﬁcit and two-deﬁcit accounts of delusions? One-deﬁcit accounts, such as Maher’s
(Maher, 1974), hold that the only impairments delusional patients have are perceptual: their mechanisms of
belief-ﬁxation operate within the normal range (although they might be biased in some way). Two-deﬁcit
accounts, by contrast, hold that delusional patients have belief-ﬁxation processes that are outside the normal
range. The distinction between one- and two-deﬁcit accounts is orthogonal to the distinction between explan-
ationist and endorsement accounts (Davies et al., 2001). Both endorsement and explanationist models can be
developed in either one-deﬁcit or two-deﬁcit terms. Consider ﬁrst the endorsement account. As the Mu¨ller–
Lyer illusion demonstrates, normal individuals do not always believe ‘that P’ when confronted with the per-
ception ‘that P.’ And although the explanationist model of delusions might be thought to suggest a two-deﬁcit
view, it can be developed in one-deﬁcit terms. Whether or not the explanationist will need to invoke a belief-
formation abnormality depends on whether a normal individual would form (and maintain) the sorts of expla-
nations of their unusual experiences that delusional patients do (Bayne & Pacherie, 2004a, 2004b).
These distinctions allow us to notice that one way one might be tempted to argue for a two-deﬁcit account is
fallacious. It is sometimes suggested that the discovery of two individuals who share the same experiential
abnormality, but only one of which was delusional, would weigh decisively in favour of a two-deﬁcit account
of delusions. The logic behind this claim is that we would need to appeal to a second (belief-ﬁxation) deﬁcit to
explain why only the delusional individual adopted the delusional belief in response to the unusual experience.
But this inference is fallacious: for all we know, a vast range of belief-ﬁxation processes fall within the normal
range, and it is quite possible that there will be individuals who share exactly the same phenomenology, and
whose belief-forming processes are within the normal range, but only some of which go on to form delusional
beliefs. Two individuals, S1 and S2, could reason from exactly the same types of experiential states, via diﬀerent
but normal belief-ﬁxation procedures (doxastic styles), to quite diﬀerent doxastic states; S1 might put a higher
premium on theoretical simplicity than S2, while S2 might put a higher premium on mechanistic explanations
than S1. The dissociation argument would show that belief-forming processes must play a role in the formation
of delusional belief, but it would not show that delusional individuals have a beliefs-forming deﬁcit.43 Or would they? It might be argued that by the very nature of the aberrant experience, even a ‘healthy’ individual may not have the
capacity to override the pre-potent doxastic response. See Hohwy and Rosenberg (2005).
4 Of course, if one thinks of a ‘‘two-factor’’ account as any account which appeals to factors about belief-ﬁxation processes to explain the
formation of delusional belief, irrespective of whether those factors place delusional patients within the normal range or not, then the
argument presented above goes through—with the caveat that the second ‘factor’ need not entail a ‘deﬁcit’ in belief-ﬁxating processes to
distinguish the deluded from non-deluded person (when beliefs were formed on the basis of identical sensory input). For this reason, we
prefer to view empiricist models of delusion in terms of two factors, given that very little is known about ‘normal’ belief-ﬁxation processes,
and since there appears to be no deﬁnitive evidence to suggest that these must be deﬁcient to account for delusion. However, with the use
of the ‘two-factor’ terminology there remains the issue of whether an account which says that delusional patients’ belief-evaluation
processes lie within the normal spectrum is representative of a ‘‘one-stage’’ (i.e., one-deﬁcit) model. Proponents of a one-stage view are
committed to the idea that a model can entail two-factors only if the second process falls outside of the normal spectrum. But both
accounts agree that an initial neuropsychological deﬁcit will account for the experiential component, and both agree that a second factor is
necessary to move the sensory experience from the status of perception to belief.
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abnormal experiences they posit and the precise way in which such experiences generate delusional beliefs,
most theorists seem inclined towards explanationism. Young and Leafhead (1996) suggest that Cotard and
Capgras patients arrive at diﬀerent delusional states because they adopt diﬀerent explanatory strategies
towards the same abnormal experience of loss of aﬀect: Cotard patients are depressed, and as a result they
explain their loss of aﬀect in terms of a change to themselves, while Capgras patients are suspicious, and as
a result they explain their loss of aﬀect in terms of changes to their environment. One could have reason to
challenge this attractive suggestion if, as Gerrans argues, there is reason to think that the Cotard and Capgras
delusions are grounded in distinct phenomenal states (Gerrans, 2002).5 Gerrans himself seems to adopt an
explanationist account of the Capgras delusion. He argues that ‘‘The Capgras person does not perceive the
other person as a double. Rather she perceives the other person and, while doing so, has a very atypical aﬀec-
tive experience. Because this experience occurs in a context in which, normally, perception is coupled with a
recognition judgment, she infers that the person she is seeing is a double’’ (2002, p. 67).
One reason for the widespread sympathy with explanationist models may be the view that the relationship
between perception and belief is typically explanatory. Some theorists think of perception in general, and emo-
tional and aﬀective states in particular, as non-representational. On this view, perceptual beliefs are adopted in
the attempt to explain our perceptual states: I believe that I am looking at a cat in an attempt to explain cer-
tain sensations I am currently having.
Such explanationist approaches to the perception-belief interface should be rejected. There are two central
respects in which they fall short. First, the explanationist needs to explain how the adoption of perceptual
beliefs (such as ‘‘this is a cat’’) could explain the sensations in question. Exactly how this explanation might
go is anything but clear. Second, the proposal ﬂies in the face of phenomenology. Our experience of the world
is shot through with representational content. This is clear in the case of visual perception, as the much dis-
cussed Mu¨ller–Lyer illusion demonstrates: the two lines appear to be of diﬀerent lengths, even when one
believes that they are the same length. But it is worthwhile pausing to consider the degree to which other facets
of experience also have representational content. Think of the patient with phantom limbs, who experiences
her phantom limb as reaching for a door, even though she knows that she is performing no such action. Think
of what it is like to watch Heider’s visual stimuli (Heider & Simmel, 1944), where one sees the geometrical
stimuli as intentional entities (‘‘the big square is chasing the small triangle’’). In all of these cases, one has per-
ceptual experiences that naturally give rise to beliefs with the same content unless (slow, conscious) processes
of doxastic inhibition intervene. Given that our experience of the world is rich with representational content, it
is not implausible to suppose that the dominant experience-based route to belief takes an endorsement form.
3. Delusions of alien control
We propose to examine the debate between endorsement and explanationist accounts in the context of delu-
sions of alien control. The delusion of alien control involves the belief that some other agent—another person,
a supernatural entity (e.g., God), a collective of others (e.g., the government), or a non-human device such as a
satellite or computer—is controlling some of one’s actions. Patients with alien control will report:
‘‘My ﬁngers pick up the pen, but I don’t control them. What they do is nothing to do with me.’’
‘‘The force moved my lips. I began to speak. The words were made for me.’’ (From Mellors, 1970, p. 18)
‘‘I felt like an automaton, guided by a female spirit who had entered me during it [an arm movement].’’
‘‘I thought you [the experimenter] were varying the movements with your thoughts.’’
‘‘I could feel God guiding me [during an arm movement].’’ (From Spence et al., 1997).
There are four main components to the content of the delusional belief. First, the patients report a sense of
passivity vis-a`-vis the movements they produce. The second component is externality: the movements are
reported as controlled by an external force; they are not just experienced as involuntary movements in the5 Cases of concurrent Capgras and Cotard delusions would also be problematic for the Young–Leafhead suggestion—see Butler (2000);
Joseph (1986); Wolfe and McKenzie (1994).
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controlling the movements is thought of as an agent, not merely a physical force as would be the case for
instance if we felt that a strong gust of wind is making us stumble. The fourth is particularity: the alien agent
is identiﬁed by the patient as a particular individual or collective agent (God, the CIA, the experimenter, etc.)
Which of these aspects of the content of the delusional belief are already parts of the patient’s experience? It
is this question that is at the heart of the debate between endorsement and explanationist accounts of alien
control.
According to endorsement accounts of alien control, the patient experiences their actions and/or their
thoughts as being under the control of someone else. The representational content of the patient’s experience
would be roughly, ‘‘so and so is making me do X,’’ or ‘‘So and so is doing X (where X involves my body).’’ A
slightly weaker account would incorporate otherness into the experience, without tying the action to any par-
ticular agent.
The explanationist might respond to the endorsement model in two ways. On the one hand, she might
argues that the contents of the delusion of alien control cannot be perceptually encoded. Alternatively, she
might allow that the contents of the alien control belief can enter into perception, but only on the condition
that the person in question already has the delusional belief: experiencing one’s action as controlled by an alien
agent is possible only on the condition that one already believes that an alien agent is controlling one’s actions.
We will focus on the stronger and more straightforward objection here.
Could the experience of someone else controlling one’s actions be loaded into perception, especially when
the person is not perceptually salient? In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss two recent models of alien
control and examine to what extent they support an endorsement approach.
4. The central-monitoring account
Frith’s original account of alien control is most naturally thought of in explanationist terms (Frith, 1987,
1992). The main components of his central account were a distinction between two kinds of intentions, stim-
ulus intentions (i.e., unconscious intentions) automatically triggered by a stimulus and willed intentions (i.e.,
conscious intentions based on internal plans and goals), together with a distinction between two levels of mon-
itoring. At the lower level, action-monitoring involved using eﬀerence-copying mechanisms to distinguish
between changes due to our actions and changes due to external factors. At the higher level, intention-mon-
itoring made possible the distinction between stimulus-induced actions and spontaneous actions resulting
from willed intentions. Frith’s model of alien control posited the existence of a deﬁcit in intention-monitoring
resulting in the loss of awareness of ‘willed’ intentions to act. The loss of such awareness was equated with an
experience of lack of sense of agency over one’s actions, and was grounded in the assumption that we usually
feel a sense of eﬀort with respect to our ‘willed’ actions.
Lack of a sense of agency over one’s action is still a far cry from the presence of a sense of alien control and
in that respect the model is clearly explanationist. Moreover, it is not even clear that an impairment in inten-
tion-monitoring could account for a sense of passivity vis-a`-vis one’s actions. The phenomenology resulting
from any such impairment would not diﬀer from that of stimulus-induced actions, and it seems that, in normal
subjects at least, a minimal sense of agency—rather than a sense of complete passivity—attaches to stimulus-
induced actions. Impaired action-monitoring combined with impaired intention-monitoring may lead to a
blurring of the distinction between what one does and what happens to one, but this does not yet amount
to an experience of alien control.
Independently of the explanationist/endorsement debate, there are several respects in which this original
account was questionable. First, as has been pointed out by several authors (Campbell, 1999; Gallagher,
2000; Pacherie, 2001; Spence, 2001), it would seem to have diﬃculty accounting for thought-insertion, given
that most of the time we do not have any conscious feeling of eﬀort or intention to think when thinking a
certain thought. Although there may be some sense of eﬀort involved in keeping one’s attention focused
for the purpose of thinking through an issue, many of our other undirected thoughts have no such quality.
A second criticism, voiced by Spence (2001), concerns the paradoxical nature of the model. Alien control is
supposed to result from defective monitoring of willed intentions: the patient is unaware of his willed inten-
tion. But on Frith’s view, one deﬁning feature of willed intentions is their conscious character. The model
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scious. As Spence points out ‘‘this apparent paradox might be resolved if the patient were said to be conscious
of his intention as one that is ‘alien,’ but then the patient would no longer be unaware of his intention, and so
his ‘unawareness’ of it could no longer form the basis of its ‘alien-ness’’’ (2001, p. 167). Third, as Frith himself
later acknowledged, the idea that experiences of alien control arise through a lack of awareness of intended
actions ‘‘is inconsistent with the patients’ ability to follow the commands of the experimenter, to avoid show-
ing utilization behaviour, and to correct errors on the basis of sensory feedback about limb positions (which
requires comparisons of intended actions and their consequences)’’ (Frith et al., 2000a, 1784).
Frith, Blakemore, and Wolpert’s revised account of delusions of alien control (Blakemore & Frith, 2003;
Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002, 2003; Frith et al., 2000a, Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000b) is based
on a more detailed model of action control. According to this model, the motor control system makes use of
two kinds of internal models, controllers and predictors, together with a number of comparators. The control-
lers, also called inverse models, compute the motor commands necessary to achieve a certain outcome given
the actual state of the system and of its environment. The predictors (or forward models) are fed a copy of
these motor commands and they compute estimates of the sensory consequences of the ensuing movement.
These predictions can be used in several ways. First, they can be used to anticipate and compensate for the
sensory eﬀects of movements. Second, they can also be used to ﬁlter sensory information and to attenuate
the component that is due to self-movement.6 Third, they can be used to maintain accurate performance in
the presence of feedback delays. The internal feedback of the predicted state of the system is available before
the actual sensory feedback and can be compared with the desired state to determine performance error and
trigger corrections.
Besides its role in the control of actions, the motor system also has a role to play in the awareness of action.
According to Frith and his colleagues, in normal circumstances when an agent is performing an action, she is
aware of (i) her goal, (ii) her intention to move, (iii) her movement having occurred, and (iv) her having ini-
tiated her movement. In contrast, a patient with delusions of control has normal awareness of (i)–(iii) but not
of (iv). According to the revised model, awareness of initiating a movement depends on awareness of the pre-
dicted sensory consequences of the movement. This view is based on evidence that awareness of initiating a
movement in healthy subject is reported by the agent between 80 and 200 ms before the movement actually
occurs (Haggard & Magno, 1999; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Libet, 1985). It therefore seems that
our awareness of intending to move may rest upon the internally predicted sensory consequences of movement,
available prior to the actual execution of the action. In delusions of control, the prediction mechanism would
be faulty and the patient would therefore be unaware of having initiated the movement.
Yet, it is somewhat unclear what Frith and his co-workers think is wrong with the predictors. In Frith et al.
(2000a) they accept Jeannerod’s point (Jeannerod, 1999) that generation and control of a movement require
one kind of representation, while conscious judgements about a movement require another kind of represen-
tation. The predictors are therefore thought to compute two diﬀerent kinds of representations, but where
exactly do they go wrong? According to Jeannerod (1999), reaching for a target, for instance, requires that
the spatial coordinates of the target be transformed into a set of commands coded in a body-centred reference
frame. Motor control relies on the comparison of predictions and outcomes within the motor system, and in
order for the comparator to use the predictions they must be coded in the same body-centred reference frame.
Conscious judgements about movement, by contrast, rely on comparisons between the internal model of the
goal and (typically visual) perceptions of the environment. It follows that such judgements are likely to be
made on the basis of central representations coded in a set of coordinates used for perception rather than
the coordinates used in the body-centred reference frame. These central representations will also be employed
by other agents or observers attending the same visual scene. Borrowing Barresi and Moore’s terminology
(Barresi & Moore, 1996), Jeannerod refers to the representations used for motor control as ‘private’ represen-
tations (because they encode ﬁrst-person information), and to the representations used for judgements about
actions as ‘public’ (because they encode third-person information). Furthermore, private representations are6 Evidence for this claim comes from a series of investigations (see Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000) showing that healthy people are
unable to tickle themselves because the sensory consequences are attenuated due to expectancies generated by the forward model.
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motor control, predictions should therefore be represented in a ‘ﬁrst-person’ or ‘private’ format, while con-
scious judgements about movements would require predictions to be represented in a ‘third person’ or ‘public’
format.
The idea, then, is that the predictors proceed in two stages. They start by computing ﬁrst-person represen-
tations of the predicted consequences of movements that are used for (non-conscious) motor control. These
ﬁrst-person representations are then translated into third-person representations that are needed for conscious
awareness of predicted sensory consequences and conscious monitoring of the motor control system.
The abnormality could be found at the ﬁrst stage, yielding faulty or inaccurate predictions of the sensory
consequences of the action, or there could be something wrong with the mechanism that translates the ﬁrst-
person representations computed at the ﬁrst stage into third-person representations. Frith et al. (2000a) reject
the ﬁrst option, arguing that there is nothing obviously abnormal in the motor control of patients with delu-
sions of control. They suggest instead that the problem may lie with the mechanism that translates the ﬁrst-
person representations into third-person ones. But there are several diﬀerent things that may be wrong with
this translation mechanism. First, it may be that it yields inaccurate third-person translations of the predic-
tions made at the ﬁrst stage. But then the problem would not be one of lack of awareness of predictions,
but one of awareness of inaccurate predictions. This would be suﬃcient to explain why schizophrenic patients,
as opposed to normal controls, do not show perceptual attenuation of self-produced sensory stimulation—for
instance, they can tickle themselves (Blakemore et al., 2000)7—but it would not explain why patients with delu-
sions of control are not aware of initiating an action. If, as the model postulates, one’s awareness of initiating
an action rests on the forward model’s prediction about the sensory consequences of an action, awareness of
initiating an action should occur whether the prediction is accurate or not.
Alternatively, it could be that although the predictions are accurately translated, for some reason they are
prevented from reaching consciousness. This would explain why patients with alien control are not aware of
initiating actions. However, the lack of sensory self-attenuation gives us reason to reject this possibility. It may
be that sensory self-attenuation requires predictions to be translated into a third-person format. Yet, it is argu-
able that these predictions need not be conscious; non-conscious, subpersonal signals would appear suﬃcient
to do the job. So if the translation mechanisms yielded accurate although non-conscious third-person repre-
sentations of the sensory consequences of a movement, sensory attenuation of self-produced movements
should be normal. Thus, it seems that to explain both the lack of sensory self-attenuation and the lack of
awareness of initiating an action, the abnormality in the predictors should result in a lack of awareness of inac-
curate third-person predictions of the consequences of an action. One would then have to explain why faulty
third-person predictions and lack of awareness co-occur. Of course, one radical possibility would be to claim
that the translation mechanism is not just abnormal but completely knocked out: no predictions, hence no
sensory attenuation; no predictions, hence nothing to be aware of!
However these aspects of the account are developed, it seems to account for two components of the phe-
nomenology of alien control: the sense of passivity is seen to result from a lack of awareness of having initiated
the action, and the sense of externality (the agent feels that some external force caused his actions) is seen to
result from a lack of sensory self-attenuation. Yet, the model does not explain why this external force is
thought of (or experienced) as an agentive force rather than simply a physical force, nor does it explain
why the patient experiences the action as having a particular author. At this point, Frith and colleagues take
an explanationist line, for they attribute these features to a (faulty) belief system. The following nicely sum-
marizes the view:
We suggest that, in delusions of control, the prediction mechanism is faulty and as a consequence self-gener-
ated movements are not attenuated and are wrongly classiﬁed as externally generated. The patient is not aware7 It has also been suggested (Dierks et al., 1999; McGuire et al., 1996) that a failure of sensory attenuation could be responsible for the
verbal hallucinations of those schizophrenic patients who perceive their inner speech as coming from external sources. During verbal
hallucinations, the auditory temporal areas remain active, which suggests that the nervous system in these patients behaves as if it were
actually processing the speech of an external speaker, since self-generated inner speech is normally accompanied by a mechanism that
decreases the responsiveness of primary auditory cortex.
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the patient’s belief system is faulty so that he interprets this abnormal sensation in an irrational way. (Blake-
more et al., 2002, p. 240).
Yet, at least some of the reports seem to suggest that the alien agency aspect of delusions of control is part
and parcel of their phenomenology, not merely the result of a further layer of interpretation.
Is it possible to do justice to these reports and to oﬀer an endorsement model that encompasses not just the
passivity and externality aspects of the phenomenology of delusions of control but also its alien agency aspect?
The simulationist account, to which we now turn, suggests a positive answer.
5. The simulationist account
The simulation account of action-monitoring developed by Jeannerod and colleagues (Daprati et al., 1997;
Georgieﬀ & Jeannerod, 1998; Jeannerod, 1999, 2003; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004) has a lot in common with
the central-monitoring account. Both accounts exploit the idea that the motor control system makes use of
internal models, including inverse and predictive models, and comparators. Both accounts also agree that
action-control mechanisms and action-awareness mechanisms are importantly connected. What distinguishes
the simulation account from the central-monitoring account is its emphasis on the fact that the motor system
serves not just to represent one’s own actions but also to represent the actions of others.
According to the simulation account, the motor system with its sets of predictors and controllers serves as a
simulation engine that constructs motor representations not just of actions the agent is preparing to execute,
but also of actions he or she observes someone else performing or simply imagines in either a ﬁrst-person per-
spective (imagining oneself acting) or a third-person perspective (imagining someone else acting). Action prep-
aration, action observation, and imagination of action share representations. The evidence for the existence of
such shared representations ranges from single-cell recording studies in monkeys, where mirror neurons were
discovered that ﬁre both during goal-directed action and observation of actions performed by another indi-
vidual (see Fogassi & Gallese, 2002, for a review), to functional neuroimaging experiments in humans (see
Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Gre`zes & Decety, 2001, for reviews), which demonstrate that the neural circuits
involved in action execution, action observation, and action imagination overlap.
According to Jeannerod and colleagues (Georgieﬀ & Jeannerod, 1998; Jeannerod, 1999) this shared motor
representations mechanism provides a functional bridge between ﬁrst-person information and third-person
information, and hence a foundation for intersubjectivity. At the same time, representations of one’s own
actions and representations of the actions of others must be disentangled, as must representations of overt
actions, whether self-performed or observed, and representations of purely covert actions—i.e., imagined
actions in the ﬁrst or third-person. At the neural level, the overlap between regions activated in these diﬀerent
conditions is only partial. Action preparation, action observation, ﬁrst-person action-imagining, and third-per-
son action-imagining should be conceived as diﬀerent modes of simulation, sharing a common core, the shared
representations, but also engaging mode-speciﬁc processes. For instance, when observing someone else acting,
one should inhibit motor output but not, of course, when one prepares to execute an action. Similarly, predic-
tions of the sensory consequences of an action should be used for perceptual attenuation when one prepares to
act, but not—or at least not in the same way—when one observes someone else acting. Each mode of sensory
simulation has a proprietary set of inhibitory mechanisms for shaping the network involved in the production of
motor output and in the analysis of actual and predicted consequences of both overt and covert actions. Activity
in non-overlapping regions as well as diﬀerences in intensity of activation in the overlapping regions are asso-
ciated with diﬀerences in simulation modes and would provide signals usable for action attribution.
Finally, an action-attribution system monitoring signals from non-overlapping parts of the networks
involved in the various simulation modes would be in charge of determining whether a given motor represen-
tation refers to a self-produced action or to an action performed by someone else and thus of attributing
actions to their source, oneself or another agent, whether it is actually performed or merely imagined. In other
words, action attribution would be based on the monitoring of the mode of simulation. Existing neurobiologi-
cal evidence suggests that the right inferior parietal cortex in conjunction with prefrontal areas may play a
crucial role in mode monitoring and self- vs. other-attribution (see Jackson & Decety, 2004, for a review).
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tral-monitoring account:
(1) Shared representations: prepared actions, observed actions, and imagined actions share motor represen-
tations yielded by a common simulation engine.
(2) Modes of simulation: although they make use of shared representations, the various modes of simula-
tion diﬀer in the way they shape the networks involved in the analysis of the actual and predicted conse-
quences of overt and covert action.
(3) A ‘who’ system: this system attributes actions to either the self or another agent by monitoring signals
speciﬁc to the diﬀerent simulation modes.
Instead of a solipsistic action-monitoring system, simply yielding a ‘‘Me/Not-Me’’ type of answer, we have
an inherently intersubjective system yielding a ‘‘Me/Another agent’’ type of answer. The implicit solipsistic
assumption of the central-monitoring account is that the predictors are typically engaged when one prepares
to act, and therefore that a mismatch between predictions and incoming sensory signals yields an interpreta-
tion of these signals as caused externally (not me). In contrast, the simulationist account insists that predictors
in the motor system are engaged both when one prepares to execute an action and when one observes an
action. Note also that in standard cases of passive or involuntary movements the predictors within the motor
system are not engaged. The activation of the predictors therefore yields a presumption of agency, although
not necessarily one’s own. The default options are thus Me/Another agent rather then Me/Not Me. To decide
between these default options is precisely the job of the ‘Who’ system. The possibility of a non-agentive exter-
nal physical force becomes a live one only when both of these default options have been eliminated.
When the answer yielded by this system is ambiguous, either because the signals themselves are ambiguous
or because the subject is not attending to them, further information may be taken into account to yield a more
deﬁnite answer. For example, the subject might use information about: (i) the presence or absence of a con-
scious goal or desired state (intentionality), (ii) the degree of match between the desired state and the actual
state (satisfaction), and (iii) the situational salience of other agents (potential source of action).8
We propose that the phenomenology of alien control might result from impairments to the mechanisms
controlling and/or monitoring the diﬀerent modes of simulation involved in the ‘Who’ system. Jeannerod
(2003) suggests that these impairments could be a consequence of the hypoactivity of the prefrontal cortex
known to exist in many schizophrenic patients. Prefrontal areas normally exert an inhibitory control on other
areas involved in various aspects of motor and sensory processing. As we have seen, the simulation model
assumes that each mode of simulation involves its own set of inhibitory mechanisms for shaping the network
involved in the control of motor output and in the analysis of the actual and predicted consequences of both
covert and overt actions. The default setting of the mode of simulation would be aﬀected by an alteration of
the inhibitory control exerted by the prefrontal cortex, resulting in abnormal activation patterns. In other
words, either the shape of the networks corresponding to diﬀerent representations, and/or the relative intensity
of activation in the areas composing these networks, would be altered. As a result, the signals used by the
‘who’ system would be inaccurate and this would give rise to attribution errors.
Through lack of inhibition, some regions may become over-activated. It is notable that an increased activity
of the right posterior parietal lobe has been observed in patients with delusions of inﬂuence, either at rest
(Franck, O’Leary, Flaum, Hichwa, & Andreasen, 2002) or during an action recognition task (Spence et al.,
1997). Prefrontal hypoactivity may also result in a loss of distinctiveness of the networks involved in the var-
ious simulation modes. The degree of overlap between the representations would increase in such a way that
the representations would become indistinguishable. Depending on the way the patterns of activation are
altered, the signals used by the ‘who’ system might either be biased toward either self- or other-attribution,
or they could simply be ambiguous.8 PaceWegner (2002), we do not think of this as the primary process of action attribution, but rather as a backup procedure, used when
the ‘‘who’’ system does not provide a clear answer.
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instance, in the experiment by Daprati et al. (1997), where subjects had to decide whether a hand they saw
executing a movement was theirs or not, only one hand was shown at a time. The experimental situation there-
fore privileged self-attribution responses because it always referred to the patient as the putative agent of the
action. Indeed, as long as the movement performed by the hand shown was of the same type as the movement
performed by the subject’s hand, schizophrenic patients with ﬁrst-rank symptoms tended to systematically
self-attribute the hand they saw. In contrast, in a later experiment (van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002), where
the subject’s hand was shown along with another hand, schizophrenic patients with ﬁrst-rank symptoms tend-
ed to misattribute the hand more frequently to the other than to themselves. Thus, in an ambiguous situation,
the match between visually perceived movement and intended movement functions as a cue for self-attribu-
tion, but the situational salience of another agent can override this cue.
In contrast to the central-monitoring model, the simulation model accounts not just for the elements of pas-
sivity and externality in the phenomenology of alien control, but also for the sense of alien agency. The motor
system represents the actions of others to the same extent that it represents one’s own. The role of the action-
attribution mechanism is therefore to disentangle situations in which the activation of the system corresponds
to the representation of one’s own actions from situations in which it represents the actions of others. This is
done by monitoring signals speciﬁc to each condition. When the signals are unambiguous (whether they are
accurate or not), one experiences either a sense of self-agency or a sense of alien agency for the action. But
even when the signals are ambiguous, the ambiguity is between self-agency and alien agency.6. Conclusion
We began this paper with the distinction between endorsements and explanationist accounts of delusion:
endorsement theorists hold that the content of the delusion in question is encoded in the patient’s perceptual
experience, explanationists hold that although the delusion is grounded in an unusual experience of some kind,
the content of the delusion results from the patient’s attempt to explain this unusual experience. Our goal in
this paper has been to develop an endorsement-based account of the delusion of alien control. We distin-
guished four aspects of the content of alien control delusions: passivity, externality, agency, and particularity.
We saw that Frith’s central-monitoring account gives us a way to understand how it is that a person could
experience their willed actions as passive and external. But Frith’s account does not take an endorsement
approach to either the agency or the particularity components of alien control. To develop an endorsement
account of alien agency we turned to Jeannerod’s simulationist account of action monitoring, arguing that
the inherent inter-subjectivity of his model gives us a way in which a person could experience their own actions
as the actions of someone else.
We ﬁnish with some outstanding questions. First, we still need to account for particularity: why do patients
with alien control delusions believe that particular agents are controlling their actions? Is this also encoded in
their experience, or do we have to appeal to explanationist principles at this point? Second, there is what
Gallagher (2004) calls the problem of speciﬁcity. Why do patients with alien control regard only some of their
actions as under the control of other agents? Because this issue is orthogonal to the debate between endorse-
ment theorists and explanationist theorists we have left it to one side here, but it is clearly a pressing one for
accounts of the delusion of alien control, no matter what form they take.References
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